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AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT SUPREME COURT
DEVELOPMENTS IN TORT AND INSURANCE
LAW: THE COMMON-LAW TRADITION
Ellis Horvitz*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the end of World War II, the California Supreme Court has
widely been regarded as the most influential state court in the nation. Its
civil decisions have frequently broken new ground, expanding concepts
of tort liability, damages and insurance coverage.
Recently, some court watchers have commented that, since 1987,
the court has moved in a more conservative direction. Is this observation
warranted? To be sure, the present court has shown less inclination than
its predecessors to expand concepts of civil liability and to enlarge dam-
ages and insurance coverage. At the very least, it has been more cautious
and selective in doing so. However, to characterize the present majority
as more conservative than its predecessors is superficial and does little to
aid an analysis of the present court.
The California Supreme Court's decisions have consistently re-
flected the major social and economic developments of its time. The pe-
riod following World War II was an age of optimism, in which all
community goals seemed to be within our reach. During this time, legis-
latures enacted laws to assist society's victims and distributed the cost by
taxation. Likewise, the courts crafted rules of tort and contract liability
in furtherance of the same objective, with insurance acting as the primary
cost-shifting mechanism.
But times and perceptions change. Old problems have not yielded
to social and economic programs designed to cure them, and new
problems have emerged. As a community, we have become increasingly
concerned with the cost, effectiveness, and unforeseen consequences of
remedial programs. Too many legitimate needs compete for too few
resources.
Changes in our circumstances and perceptions have occurred
slowly, but inexorably. Should the courts be unmindful of these changes,
ignore the lessons of recent experience, and cling to formulas based on
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conditions that no longer exist? Prior to and since 1987, that has not
been the approach of the California Supreme Court.
The present members of the court are contemporary, as their prede-
cessors were. They are pragmatic, deeply concerned with the impact that
their decisions will have on the litigants before them as well as others
who are not. They are prepared to reexamine legal assumptions and con-
clusions. In addition, they are willing to modify or occasionally reject
them-where prior doctrine no longer serves current community needs.
The cases discussed in this Essay bear out this evaluation.
II. DISCUSSION
A. 1940-1986. A Sampling of Significant Tort and
Insurance Decisions
For the past fifty years, the California Supreme Court has led the
nation in defining the reach of civil law. In tort and insurance law in
particular, the court generally broadened defendants' potential liability.
The following decisions demonstrate that trend.
In the seminal case of Ybarra v. Spangard,I the court liberalized the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which allows a plaintiff to shift the burden
of proving causation to the defendant where: (1) The accident giving rise
to the plaintiff's injury is of a type which does not ordinarily occur unless
someone is negligent; (2) the accident was caused by an instrumentality
under the exclusive control of defendant; and (3) the plaintiff did not
voluntarily contribute to the cause of the accident. 2 In Ybarra, the plain-
tiff underwent an appendectomy and awoke from surgery with an injured
shoulder. Although the plaintiff could not identify the individual who
had "exclusive control" over the instrumentality that caused his injury,
the court held that the plaintiff could nonetheless invoke the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine by identifying and suing "all those defendants who had
any control over [the plaintiff's] body or the instrumentalities which
might have caused the injuries."4
In 1963 Justice Traynor authored the landmark product liability de-
cision of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. ,' holding a manufac-
1. 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
2. Id. at 489, 154 P.2d at 689; see also Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal. 2d 436,
449, 247 P.2d 344, 348 (1952) (allowing plaintiff injured by exploding soda bottle to invoke
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur).
3. Ybarra, 25 Cal. 2d at 488, 154 P.2d at 688.
4. Id at 494, 154 P.2d at 691; accord Raber v. Tumin, 36 Cal. 2d 654, 660, 226 P.2d 574,
577 (1951).
5. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
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turer strictly liable in tort for placing an article on the market that the
manufacturer knew would be used without inspection for defects, and
which proved to have a defect that caused injury.6 Subsequent California
Supreme Court cases applied this holding in other contexts, imposing
strict liability not only on manufacturers, but on retailers and distribu-
tors in an effort to spread the cost of injuries caused by defective
products.7
With Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,8 the court established the new
concept of "market share" product liability. The court relaxed the plain-
tiff's burden of proving causation when identifying which manufacturer
produced a product that allegedly harmed the plaintiff, if the product
that is marketed has "effects... which are delayed for many years [and
play] a significant role in creating the unavailability of proof."9 Under
Sindell, each manufacturer sued by the plaintiff was strictly liable based
on the manufacturer's share of the product's market, even though the
plaintiff failed to prove which manufacturer's product was used."0
In Barker v. Lull Engineering," the court adopted another proce-
dural rule to ease the plaintiff's task of proving liability for injuries
caused by a defective product. It held that in a design defect case, if the
plaintiff proves the defendant's product's design caused the plaintiff's in-
jury, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant. 2 In response, the de-
fendant must show the product meets the reasonable expectations of a
consumer and its benefits outweigh any dangers in its design. 3
Before 1969 a landowner's duty of care to visitors was determined
by a sliding scale based on the injured party's status as a trespasser, invi-
6. Id at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
7. See, e.g., Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 262-63, 391 P.2d 168, 171-
72, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 899-900 (1964); see also Elmore v. American Motors, 70 Cal. 2d 578,
585, 451 P.2d 84, 88, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652, 656 (1969) (applying strict liability to claims of injured
bystander notwithstanding victim's lack of privity with manufacturer); Seely v. White Motor
Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 18-19, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 23-24, 403 P.2d 145, 151-52 (1965) (recognizing risk
spreading policy as basis for adopting strict products liability).
8. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
9. Id. at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
10. Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
11. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
12. Id. at 435, 573 P.2d at 457-58, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 239-40.
13. Id. at 432, 573 P.2d at 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 238. In Murphy v. E.R. Squibb & Sons,
40 Cal. 3d 672, 710 P.2d 247, 221 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1985), the court declined, however, to
expand liability for product defects as far as the plaintiffs would have liked. Id. at 680, 684,
710 P.2d at 252, 255, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 452, 455. There, the court refused to apply strict
liability where the plaintiff was complaining of the pharmacist-defendant's failure to warn of
possible dangers in prescription drugs. Id at 677-81, 710 P.2d at 250-53, 221 Cal. Rptr. at
450-53.
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tee or licensee. 14 The court in Rowland v. Christian 15 eliminated the slid-
ing scale test so that a landowner's liability would instead be determined
by a reasonable care standard and that the status of the injured party
would no longer be determinative.
16
In Becker v. LR.M. Corp. ,17 the court expanded landowner liability.
It held that a purchaser of residential rental property has an affirmative
duty to inspect it for safety hazards 8 and can be strictly liable for inju-
ries caused by defects existing at the time the property is purchased, even
if the injury does not occur until after the purchase.1 9 One year later, the
court again expanded landowners' liability. In Francis T. v. Village
Green Owners Ass'n,20 the court held that a plaintiff who was attacked on
the defendant's property need not prove the defendant had notice of
prior similar attacks; foreseeability of harm could be established without
such evidence.21
The court replaced the doctrine of contributory negligence with
comparative fault in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. 22 The resulting elimination of
contributory negligence as an absolute defense wrought fundamental
change, which has spawned a virtual avalanche of new law.
For example, in 1978, the court announced a rule of equitable com-
parative indemnity among concurrent tortfeasors. This rule, set forth in
American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court,2" was "an extension of the
[Li v. Yellow Cab Co.] comparative fault doctrine which allowed loss to
be apportioned between plaintiff and defendants according to their re-
spective responsibility for the loss."' 24 In addition, the court held in Daly
14. See Oettinger v. Stewart, 24 Cal. 2d 133, 148 P.2d 19 (1944).
15. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
16. Id. at 119, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104. But see Beauchamp v. Los Gatos
Golf Course, 273 Cal. App. 2d 20, 25, 77 Cal. Rptr. 914, 918 (1969) (stating that terms "invi-
tee," "licensee," and "trespasser" are relevant to jury and have not been abandoned despite
Rowland).
17. 38 Cal. 3d 454, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1985).
18. Id. at 469, 698 P.2d at 125, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 222.
19. I at 464, 698 P.2d at 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
20. 42 Cal. 3d 490, 723 P.2d 573, 229 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1986).
21. Id. at 501-03, 723 P.2d at 578-80, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 461-63 (citing Isaacs v. Huntington
Memorial Hosp., 38 Cal. 3d 112, 126, 695 P.2d 653, 659, 211 Cal. Rptr. 356, 362 (1985)
("[F]oreseeability is determined in light of all the circumstances and not by a rigid application
of a mechanical 'prior similars' rule."); Kwaitkowski v. Superior Trading Co., 123 Cal. App.
3d 324, 330, 176 Cal. Rptr. 494, 497 (1981)).
22. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
23. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978), superseded by statute as stated
in Miller v. Stouffer, 9 Cal. App. 4th 70, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 454 (1992).
24. GEM Developers v. Hallcraft Homes, Inc., 213 Cal. App. 3d 419, 426-27, 261 Cal.
Rptr. 626, 630 (1989) (citing Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 1197, 753 P.2d
585, 590, 246 Cal. Rptr. 629, 633 (1988)).
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v. General Motors Corp.25 that comparative fault principles apply to strict
liability actions.26 These cases continued the Li v. Yellow Cab Co. trend
of adopting flexible rules to allow an equitable apportionment of liability
among all parties responsible for causing the harm.
The 1960s witnessed a change in the compensability of noneconomic
damages. In Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co. ,27 the court decided,
four-to-three, that a plaintiff may not recover for emotional distress un-
less the plaintiff suffered physical injury or was in the "zone of danger"
'28
created by the defendant's negligent conduct.29 Five years later, how-
ever, in Dillon v. Legg,30 the court held that a mother who witnessed a
negligent act that caused the death of her child could recover for emo-
tional distress even though she was not in the "zone of danger" and did
not fear for her own safety.31
Similarly, in Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,32 a woman was
negligently misdiagnosed as suffering from syphilis and was directed to
tell her husband about the diagnosis so that he could receive treatment as
well.33 Although the husband could not meet the criteria for "by-
stander" recovery under Dillon v. Legg, the court held that he was never-
theless a "direct victim" of the physician's negligence, because the
physician directed the wife to inform the husband of the diagnosis, and
he was required to undergo tests himself.34 In Ochoa v. Superior Court,
35
the court allowed a plaintiff to pursue emotional distress damages after
she witnessed and was aware of the slow progressive decline in the health
of her child as a result of a physician's neglect of the child's immediate
medical needs.36
25. 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
26. Id. at 742, 575 P.2d at 1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
27. 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963), overruled by Dillon v. Legg, 68
Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
28. Id. at 302, 379 P.2d at 517, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
29. Id. at 302-03, 379 P.2d at 516-17, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 36-37. In the case of negligent
operation of a motor vehicle, the zone of danger is that in which the plaintiff was in such
physical danger that it would cause fear of his or her own safety, even though he or she was
not actually involved. Id. at 302, 379 P.2d at 516-17, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 36-37 (citing Reed v.
Moore, 156 Cal. App. 2d 43, 319 P.2d 80 (1957)).
30. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
31. Id. at 732-33, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
32. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
33. Id. at 919, 616 P.2d at 814, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
34. Id. at 923, 616 P.2d at 816-17, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834-35.
35. 39 Cal. 3d 159, 703 P.2d 1, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1985).
36. Id. at 169-70, 703 P.2d at 8, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 668. The court also held, however, that
a cause of action could not be premised on a Molien "direct victim" theory because the defend-
ant's negligent actions were directed solely at the plaintiff's son, and not at the plaintiff. Id. at
172-73, 703 P.2d at 10, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 670.
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Another avenue of recovery previously unavailable to injured plain-
tiffs was created by the court in Vesely v. Sager.37 In Vesely, the court
held that liability may be imposed on a vendor of alcoholic beverages for
providing alcoholic drinks to a customer who, as a result of intoxication,
injures a third person.38
In Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. ,39 the court held that a plaintiff
could recover tort damages if the plaintiff could prove that his or her
discharge from employment violated public policy.40 Four years later,
the court carried the Tameny ruling one long step further in Seaman's
Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., holding that a plaintiff
was entitled to bring a tort action-and obtain punitive damages-
against a defendant who in bad faith denied the existence of a contract in
response to the plaintiff's efforts to enforce the contract.42
By 1958 insurance bad faith emerged as an important basis for tort
liability. In Comunale v. Traders & General Insurance Co. ,43 the court
held that an insurer could be compelled to indemnify its insured in excess
of policy limits if the insurer could have settled an underlying action
against the insured within policy limits but failed to do so.' And in
Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. ,45 the court held that an insured could
recover tort damages, including emotional distress damages, if the in-
surer unreasonably failed to settle a claim against the insured,46 thereby
unleashing a torrent of new litigation.
37. 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971).
38. Id. at 165, 486 P.2d at 159-60, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 631-32. Vesely was abrogated by the
California Legislature in 1978. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25602(c) (West 1985) (amend-
ing CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (1953)); see also Cory v. Shierloh, 29 Cal. 3d 430, 439,
629 P.2d 8, 13, 174 Cal. Rptr. 500, 505 (1981) (upholding constitutionality of statute providing
immunity from civil liability to providers of intoxicating beverages).
39. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
40. Id. at 178, 610 P.2d at 1337, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 846; see also Commodore Home Sys.,
Inc. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 3d 211, 221, 649 P.2d 912, 918, 185 Cal. Rptr. 270, 276 (1982)
(allowing punitive damages for violations of California's Fair Employment and Housing Act
when there has been oppression, fraud or malice).
41. 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984).
42. Id. at 769, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
43. 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
44. Id. at 660, 328 P.2d at 202.
45. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
46. Id. at 431-33, 426 P.2d at 177-78, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17-18; see also Johansen v. Califor-
nia State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau, 15 Cal. 3d 9, 12-13, 538 P.2d 744, 746, 123 Cal. Rptr.
288, 290 (1975) (holding that failure to settle claim against insured, thereby exposing insured
to substantial risk of liability in excess of policy limits, gives rise to bad faith action even if
insurer reasonably but mistakenly believed policy did not provide coverage).
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In other cases the court imposed a quasi-fiduciary duty on insur-
ers,4' by expanding the rights of plaintiffs to sue insurers for improper
handling of a claim under an insurance contract.4" In addition, the court
adopted procedural rules that decreased the burden of proving liability or
damages in such actions.49 The court also developed principles of insur-
ance contract construction which broadened an insurer's obligations.
For example, in Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. ,50 the court observed that
most insurance policies are adhesion contracts and, as such, must be con-
strued strictly against the insurer. 1 The court also held that the duty to
47. See, eg., Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 818-19, 620 P.2d 141,
145, 169 Cal. Rptr. 691, 695 (1979) ("For the insurer to fulfill its obligation not to impair the
right of the insured to receive the benefits of the [insurance] agreement, it... must give at least
as much consideration to the latter's interests as it does to its own."), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 912
(1980); Davis v. Blue Cross, 25 Cal. 3d 418, 427-28, 600 P.2d 1060, 1065-66, 158 Cal. Rptr.
828, 833-34 (1979); Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 460-61, 521 P.2d 1103,
1108-09, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711, 716-17 (1974).
48. See, ag., Sarchett v. Blue Shield, 43 Cal. 3d 1, 13-15, 729 P.2d 267, 275-77, 233 Cal.
Rptr. 76, 184-86 (1987) (holding that insurer acting with knowledge that insured is ignorant of
express policy terms regarding right to arbitration after claim is denied, or insurer which fails
to advise insured of these rights acts, in bad faith); Brandt v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 813,
815, 693 P.2d 796, 797, 210 Cal. Rptr. 211, 212 (1985) (holding "[w]hen an insurer tortiously
withholds benefits .... attorney's fees, reasonably incurred to compel payment of the policy
benefits, [are] recoverable as an element of the damages resulting from such tortious con-
duct"); Davis, 25 Cal. 3d at 428, 600 P.2d at 1065, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 833 (holding failure to
"reasonably ... inform an insured of the insured's rights and obligations under the insurance
policy" may give rise to bad faith liability); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 575,
510 P.2d 1032, 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 486 (1973) (stating insurers cannot "unreasonably
and in bad faith withhold[ ] payment of the claim of its insured"); Barrera v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 71 Cal. 2d 659, 663, 456 P.2d 674, 677, 79 Cal. Rptr. 106, 109 (1969) (ruling
that insurers "must undertake a reasonable investigation of the insured's insurability within a
reasonable period of time from the acceptance of the application and the issuance of a policy");
cf Egan, 24 Cal. 3d at 824, 620 P.2d at 149, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 699 (holding that insurance
company could be liable for bad faith and punitive damages arising out of conduct by manage-
rial employees, but employees themselves could not be liable for bad faith because "they [were]
not parties to the insurance contract and not subject to the implied covenant").
49. See, e.g., White v. Western Title Ins. Co., 40 Cal. 3d 870, 888-90, 710 P.2d 309, 319-
20, 221 Cal. Rptr. 509, 519-20 (1985) (creating exception to ban of CAL. EVID. CODE § 1152,
admissibility of settlement offers; and holding, over vigorous dissent by Justice Malcolm Lu-
cas, that insurer's offer to settle may not be used as evidence that insured's claim is covered,
but unreasonably low settlement offer is admissible as evidence that insurer failed to process
claim in good faith), superseded by statute as stated in Maler v. Superior Court, 220 Cal. App.
3d 1592, 270 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1990); Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 31
Cal. 3d 785, 792, 647 P.2d 86, 90, 183 Cal. Rptr. 810, 814 (1982) (holding evidence of insurer's
conduct toward other insureds is discoverable as potentially leading to circumstantial evidence
of malice toward insured).
50. 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966).
51. Id. at 269-71, 419 P.2d at 171-72, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 107-08; see also Silberg v. California
Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 464, 521 P.2d 1103, 1111, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711, 719 (1974) (hold-
ing that ambiguities in insurance policy must be construed against insurer).
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defend an insured under a liability policy is broader than the duty to
indemnify, and that an insurer must defend its insured as long as the
policy potentially provides coverage.5 2
This trend of expanded liability was not without exception. For ex-
ample, while Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals3 and Ochoa v. Supe-
rior Court54 promoted recovery for emotional distress damages, the
court did not look favorably upon all attempts to extend liability in favor
of plaintiffs who did not directly suffer an injury as a result of the defend-
ant's conduct. In Turpin v. Sortini,s1 the court held that a child cannot
recover general damages in a "wrongful life" action based on the defend-
ant's allegedly negligent conduct, without which the child would not
have been conceived and born. The child could recover only special
damages resulting from the child's severe birth defect.5 6 Moreover, in
Borer v. American Airlines, 7 the court refused to allow children plaintiffs
to assert a loss of consortium claim based on injury to a parent. The
court explained that "social policy must at some point intervene to de-
limit liability."' 58 Similarly, in the companion case of Baxter v. Superior
Court,59 the court refused to recognize a parent's cause of action for loss
of consortium based on injury to one's child.'
The court's decision in Silberg v. California Life Insurance Co.61
also reflected restraint in expanding tort liability. In Silberg, the court
held that an insured could not recover punitive damages against an in-
surer for denying coverage, if the insurer had no prior notice that its
construction of the plaintiff's policy was incorrect.62 In addition, the
court placed firm limits on an insured's right to recover emotional dis-
tress damages in an insurance bad faith action.63
52. Gray, 65 Cal. 2d at 273-75, 419 P.2d at 174-76, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 110-12.
53. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
54. 39 Cal. 3d 159, 703 P.2d 1, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1985).
55. 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982).
56. Id at 237-39, 643 P.2d at 965-66, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 348-49.
57. 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1977).
58. Id at 446, 563 P.2d at 861, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
59. 19 Cal. 3d 461, 563 P.2d 871, 138 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977).
60. Id at 465, 563 P.2d at 874, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 318.
61. 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974).
62. Id: at 463, 521 P.2d at 1110, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
63. Id at 460, 521 P.2d at 1108, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 716 (stating not only must plaintiff
produce actual evidence of emotional distress in case such as this, but plaintiff must also estab-
lish that defendant's conduct was legal cause of distress); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal.
3d 566, 580, 510 P.2d 1032, 1041-42, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 489-90 (1973); see also Mitchell v.
Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 591, 608, 691 P.2d 642, 652, 208 Cal. Rptr. 886, 896 (1984) (hold-
ing that plaintiff's claim of emotional distress must be reasonable and genuine, and plaintiff
1152 [Vol. 26:1145
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These tort and insurance decisions demonstrate that, by the end of
1986, the California Supreme Court followed a general trend of ex-
panding liability, but had also drawn the line at creating new rights and
obligations where, as in the area of emotional distress damages, societal
interests required some judicially determined limits.
B. A Survey of Selected Tort and Insurance Decisions After 1986
The court's opinions since 1986 build upon established precedents in
California, but demonstrate considerable attention to contemporary
sources, including recent judicial decisions in other states, current law
review articles and other scholarly sources. Nostalgia finds no expression
in the court's decisions. In several areas, the court has slowed or halted
the expansion of tort liability and insurance coverage. But again, not all
decisions fit this description. The court's decisions before and after 1987
cannot be separated by a bright line into two discrete sets of conflicting
case law. Changes have been gradual and reflect shifting community per-
ceptions of social and economic problems. Generally, the current court's
shaping of the law has been selective, cautious and moderate. The fol-
lowing cases are illustrative.
In Brown v. Superior Court,64 a products liability action against
manufacturers of the drug diethylstilbestrol (DES),65 the court held that,
because of the public interest in the development, availability and af-
fordability of prescription drugs, a manufacturer of a drug cannot be
held strictly liable for injuries caused by the drug, as long as the drug was
properly prepared and accompanied by warnings of any dangers that
were known or scientifically knowable at the time the drug was distrib-
uted.66 The court also held that defendant manufacturers in a products
liability action based upon "market share" liability under Sindell v. Ab-
bott Laboratories 67 are not jointly liable for the plaintiffs' injuries, but are
instead liable only for a portion of the damages that corresponds to the
manufacturer's share of the relevant market for the product.6 The court
reasoned that "the imposition of joint liability among defendant manu-
facturers in a market share action would frustrate Sindell's goal of
has no right to compensation for emotional distress which is unreasonable or exaggerated re-
sponse to facts).
64. 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 751 P.2d 470, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1988).
65. DES is a synthetic estrogen used to prevent miscarriages. Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 26
Cal. 3d 588, 593, 607 P.2d 924, 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 133, cert denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
66. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1065-69, 751 P.2d at 480-83, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 421-24.
67. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
68. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1072-75, 751 P.2d at 485-87, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 426-28.
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achieving a balance between the interests of DES plaintiffs and manufac-
turers of the drug."
69
In Mexicali Rose v. Superior Court,70 the court revisited the 1936
products liability decision in Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co. ,71 in the context
of an injury caused by the plaintiff's ingestion of a food product prepared
by the defendant. In a four-to-three decision, the court modified, but
declined to abandon, the often criticized natural/foreign substance dis-
tinction used to determine liability arising out of harmful food prod-
ucts.72 Following "the trend developing in courts recently considering
the issue,"" the court held that a plaintiff injured in this manner may sue
on a strict products liability theory only by proving a foreign substance
(one not reasonably expected by the average consumer) was present in
the food. Thus, the presence of a harmful, naturally occurring substance
in food will not support a strict liability action.74
The court had occasion to answer a procedural question left open in
the earlier decisions of American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court 71
and Li v. Yellow Cab Co. :76 whether comparative fault principles elimi-
nated "assumption of risk" as a complete defense to a personal injury
69. Id. at 1075, 751 P.2d at 487, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 428 (citing numerous legal commenta-
tors supporting this result). See, eg., Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Mahshigian, Failure to
Identify the Defendant in Tort Law: Towards a Legislative Solution, 73 CAL. L. REV. 941, 957
(1985); Rebecca A. Boys, Comment, The Market Share Theory: Sindell's Contribution to In-
dustry-Wide Liability, 19 Hous. L. REv. 107, 131-32 (1981); Steven D. Elmert, Note, DES
Judicial Interest Balancing and Innovation, 22 B.C. L. REv. 747, 770, 774 (1981); Kathryn T.
Frame, Note, Products Liability, 34 OKLA. L. REV. 843, 853 (1981); Note, Market Share
Liability: An Answer to the DES Causation Problem, 94 HARV. L. REV. 668, 673 (1981);
Richard P. Murray, Note, Sindell v. Abbot Laboratories: A Market Share Approach to DES
Causation, 69 CAL. L. REv. 1179, 1194 (1981).
70. 1 Cal. 4th 617, 822 P.2d 1292, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 145 (1992).
71. 6 Cal. 2d 674, 59 P.2d 144 (1936), overruled by Mexicali Rose v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.
4th 617, 822 P.2d 1292, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 145 (1992).
72. Mexicali Rose, I Cal. 4th at 630, 822 P.2d at 1301-02, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 154-55.
73. Id., 822 P.2d at 1301, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 154.
74. Id. However, in a departure from the earlier rule in Mix, the court in Mexicali Rose
held that a plaintiff injured by a naturally occurring substance may state a cause of action for
negligence.
Such a new rule, expanding a restaurateur's potential liability and allowing an action
in negligence for injuries caused by both natural and foreign substances in food, cor-
responds to modem developments in tort law. This court has recognized that tradi-
tional tort law principles support imposition of a duty of care when one is in a
position to exercise custody or control over another.
Id. at 632, 822 P.2d at 1303, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156.
75. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978), superseded by statute as stated
in Miller v. Stouffer, 9 Cal. App. 4th 70, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 454 (1992).
76. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
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action. In both Knight v. Jewett" and Ford v. Gouin,78 a divided court
rendered four separate opinions. No single view won a clear majority,
but the approach approved by the plurality calls for a "primary assump-
tion of the risk" analysis under which a participant in an inherently risky
sport or other similar activity owes only a duty not to engage in conduct
"so reckless as to be totally outside the range of the ordinary activity
involved in the sport."' 79 Less reckless conduct cannot subject the par-
ticipant to liability regardless of the plaintiff's subjective knowledge-or
lack of knowledge-of the dangers inherent in the activity.80 This ap-
proach reflects a desire to exact personal responsibility from those who
choose to engage in risky behavior, and retreats from the notion that the
law will provide a remedy for every injury.
In Elden v. Sheldon,"1 the court looked to the societal benefit of
providing certainty in the law as a basis for limiting "bystander emo-
tional distress" actions cognizable under a Dillon v. Legg8 2 theory. The
court held that an unmarried cohabitant of a person injured by the de-
fendant does not have a sufficiently close relationship to the victim to
warrant recovery for bystander emotional distress: "[T]he consequences
of a negligent act must be limited in order to avoid an intolerable burden
on society," 3 and a "bright line in this area of the law is essential."
'8 4
The court again discussed recovery for emotional distress in Thing v.
La Chusa.5 After tracing the history of Dillon v. Legg, 6 the court noted
that the case-by-case approach in cases following Dillon "not only pro-
duced inconsistent rulings in the lower courts, but has provoked consid-
erable critical comment by scholars who attempt to reconcile the
cases." 87 To clarify the confusion over the right to recover for negligent
infliction of emotional distress, the court chose not to create different
standards for recovery, but instead chose to solidify the Dillon "guide-
lines" into prerequisites for recovery."8 Thus a plaintiff who is not physi-
cally injured by the defendant may not recover damages for negligent
infliction of emotional distress unless the plaintiff is closely related to the
77. 3 Cal. 4th 296, 834 P.2d 696, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2 (1992).
78. 3 Cal. 4th 339, 834 P.2d 724, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 30 (1992).
79. Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 320, 834 P.2d at 711, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17 (plurality opinion).
80. Id. at 313, 834 P.2d at 706, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 12 (plurality opinion).
81. 46 Cal. 3d 267, 758 P.2d 582, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1988).
82. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
83. Elden, 46 Cal. 3d at 274, 758 P.2d at 586, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
84. Id. at 277, 758 P.2d at 588, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 260.
85. 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1989).
86. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
87. Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 661, 771 P.2d at 825, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
88. Id. at 667-68, 771 P.2d at 829-30, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 880-81.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
victim, contemporaneously observes the conduct causing the victim's in-
jury, and suffers severe or serious emotional distress.8 9 The court recog-
nized that persons in other situations may suffer deep distress from
witnessing violent events, but reiterated the need emphasized in earlier
decisions "to avoid limitless liability out of all proportion to the degree of
a defendant's negligence, and against which it is impossible to insure
without imposing unacceptable costs on those among whom the risk is
spread."
90
Similarly, in Christensen v. Superior Court,91 the court held that
only "close family members" may recover damages for emotional dis-
tress based on the defendant's negligent handling of a deceased relative's
remains. 92 Moreover, the court limited recovery to those relatives who
were aware that funeral services were being performed and on whose
behalf the services were undertaken.
93
The results in Elden v. Sheldon,94 Thing v. La Chusa 95 and Chris-
tensen v. Superior Court,96 reflect the sentiments expressed in earlier
supreme court decisions grappling with the societal problems of poten-
tially limitless liability. The court's resolution of that problem in the area
of "bystander" emotional distress cases is fully consistent with the
court's reasoning twelve years earlier in Borer v. American Airlines.97
The court in Borer held that recovery for loss of consortium must be
narrowly circumscribed because claims for such an intangible loss "may
substantially increase the number of claims asserted in ordinary accident
cases, the expense of settling or resolving such claims, and the ultimate
liability of defendants." 98
Notwithstanding language in the court's decisions indicating cau-
tion in expanding liability, the court has not foreclosed all attempts to
broaden recovery for emotional distress. In Burgess v. Superior Court,99
the court held that a mother may recover damages against a physician
for negligently inflicted emotional distress where the mother's child was
89. I1d
90. I.d at 664, 771 P.2d at 826-27, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 877-78.
91. 54 Cal. 3d 868, 820 P.2d 181, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 79 (1991).
92. Id. at 875, 820 P.2d at 183, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 81.
93. Id.
94. 46 Cal. 3d 267, 758 P.2d 582, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1988).
95. 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1989).
96. 54 Cal. 3d 868, 820 P.2d 181, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 79 (1991).
97. 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1977).
98. Id. at 444, 563 P.2d at 860, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 304; accord Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d
220, 237, 643 P.2d 954, 964, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 347 (1982); Baxter v. Superior Court, 19 Cal.
3d 461, 464, 563 P.2d 871, 873, 138 Cal. Rptr. 315, 317 (1977).
99. 2 Cal. 4th 1064, 831 P.2d 1197, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 615 (1992).
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injured during birth.I" ° Although the mother did not meet the Dillon
guidelines because she was not contemporaneously aware of the negligent
action causing her child's injury, she could recover as the "direct victim"
of the physician's negligence in delivering her child because the physi-
cian-patient relationship included a duty to exercise due care in ensuring
the health of the child as well as the mother."I This decision is consis-
tent with the court's earlier opinion in Molien v. Kaiser Foundation
Hospitals.102
In Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. ,103 the court reexamined the avail-
ability of tort damages in actions between contracting parties. While the
court's decision in Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil
Co. " indicated a willingness to expand recovery in this area, the court
in Foley rejected the plaintiff's attempt to expand the law to obtain tort
damages for bad faith termination of an employment contract.10 5 The
court stated: "In our view, the underlying problem in the line of cases
relied on by plaintiff lies in the decisions' uncritical incorporation of the
insurance model into the employment context, without careful considera-
tion of the fundamental policies underlying the development of tort and
contract law in general ... 1.06
As in other cases, the court in Foley surveyed a wide selection of
legal commentary in reaching its conclusion that, in the employment
context at least, contract remedies, as opposed to tort actions, offer "the
most appropriate method" for obtaining relief from a breach of con-
tract.10 7 The court explained that the important societal goals served by
this rule include commercial stability enhanced by the predictability of
the consequence of.conduct related to employment contracts; preserva-
tion of an employer's discretion to dismiss an employee without hin-
drance from the fear that doing so will give rise to potential tort recovery
in every case; the difficulty of confining tort awards to "deserving" plain-
tiffs due to the inherently indefinite nature of the term "good faith" and
the consequent inability to dispose of unmeritorious actions at the de-
murrer or summary judgment stage. 10
100. Id. at 1085, 831 P.2d at 1209, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 627.
101. Id at 1076-78, 831 P.2d at 1202-04, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 620-22.
102. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 923, 616 P.2d 813, 816-17, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 834-35 (1980).
103. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
104. 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984).
105. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 699-700, 765 P.2d at 401, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
106. Id at 689, 765 P.2d at 393, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 231-32.
107. Id at 695-96, 699, 765 P.2d at 398-99, 401, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 236-37, 239.
108. Id at 696-97, 765 P.2d at 398-99, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 236-37; see also id. at 699, 765 P.2d
at 401, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 239 ("The expansion of tort remedies in the employment context has
potentially enormous consequences for the stability of the business community.").
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Despite its reluctance in Foley to open the doors to additional tort
actions arising out of a contractual relationship, the court, in Gantt v.
Sentry Insurance,1" allowed tort damages for wrongful discharge of a
"whistle-blowing" employee.110 The court held that the discharge vio-
lated public policy, and thus reaffirmed the rule in Tameny v. Atlantic
Richfield Co. I The court in Gantt also held that worker's compensa-
tion is not the employee's exclusive remedy against the employer in a
wrongful discharge action: Discharge in violation of public policy "can-
not be deemed 'a risk reasonably encompassed within the compensation
bargain.'"" 2 However, the court cautioned that this is not an open-
ended invitation to employees to sue their employers in tort. According
to the court, the right to bring such an action must be "carefully tethered
to fundamental policies that are delineated in constitutional or statutory
provisions.""'
In Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Cos., 114 the court
overruled its earlier expansive decision in Royal Globe Insurance Co. v.
Superior Court."' In Moradi-Shalal, the court held that insureds may
seek damages for fraud or breach of the common-law duty of good faith,
but may not assert a Royal Globe private right of action for an insurer's
violation of Insurance Code section 790.03, which codified common-law
bad faith rules. 6 In reaching this conclusion, the court reiterated the
concerns expressed by the three dissenting justices in Royal Globe who
believed the decision created a cause of action which was "'wholly in-
consistent both with our own firmly established California precedent,
and with a fair and reasoned analysis of the applicable legislation.' ,117
The court then considered decisions from other jurisdictions, 118 scholarly
109. 1 Cal. 4th 1083, 824 P.2d 680, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 874 (1992).
110. Id at 1100-01, 824 P.2d at 691-92, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 885-86.
111. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
112. 1 Cal. 4th at 1101, 824 P.2d at 692, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 886.
113. I at 1095, 824 P.2d at 687-88, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 881-82.
114. 46 Cal. 3d 287, 758 P.2d 58, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1988).
115. 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979), overruled by Moradi-Shalal v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 46 Cal. 3d 287, 758 P.2d 58, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1988).
116. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 304-05, 758 P.2d at 68-69, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 126-127; see
CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03 (West 1972 & Supp. 1993).
117. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 296, 758 P.2d at 62, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 120 (quoting Royal
Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d 880, 898, 592 P.2d 329, 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842,
854 (1979) (Richardson, J., dissenting)).
118. Id. at 297-98, 758 P.2d at 63-64, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 121-22.
mhe courts in eight states have expressly acknowledged, but declined to follow,
Royal Globe, and the courts in nine states have implicitly rejected its holding. In-
deed, only two states other than California recognize a statutory cause of action for
private litigants, and the courts in those states have rejected Royal Globe's conclusion
that a single violation of the statute is a sufficient basis for a suit for damages.
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criticism of Royal Globe,' 19 and a report by the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners recommending against including a private
right of action in the model act from which California's Unfair Trade
Practices Act 2' was derived. 2' The court explained that additional leg-
islative history suggested remedies for violation of the Act were to be
administrative rather than civil.122 The majority decision thus reflects a
recurring theme: consideration of the practical implications of its deci-
sions and respect for principles espoused by commentators and courts in
other jurisdictions.
These themes appear again in the insurance coverage cases, in which
the court has struck a careful balance of interests in construing insurance
contract rights and obligations. In Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co. ,123 the court held that when concurrent causes result in property
damage to a home, but only one cause is a covered peril under the home-
owner's insurance policy, coverage exists only if the covered peril is the
predominant cause of the loss.1 24 The primary rationale for this decision
was a pragmatic one:
[T]he reasonable expectations of the insurer and the insured in
the first party property loss portion of a homeowner's policy-
as manifested in the distribution of risks, the proportionate pre-
Id (footnotes omitted).
119. Id. at 298-99, 758 P.2d at 64, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 122-23. The court noted that:
These articles emphasize both the erroneous nature of our holding (i.e., the
strained interpretation of the statutory provisions, and the misreading or disregard of
available legislative history) and the undesirable social and economic effects of the
decision (i.e., multiple litigation, unwarranted bad faith claims, coercive settlements,
excessive jury awards, and escalating insurance, legal and other "transaction" costs).
Id. at 299, 758 P.2d at 64, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 123; see also id. at 301-03, 758 P.2d at 66-67, 250
Cal. Rptr. at 124-25 (noting practical difficulties commentators observed arising from Royal
Globe actions).
120. California Unfair Trade Practices Act, CAL. INS. CODE §§ 790-790.10 (West 1972 &
Supp. 1993).
121. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 299, 758 P.2d at 65, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
122. Id at 300-01, 758 P.2d at 65-66, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 123-24. While it eliminated third-
party bad faith actions, the court recognized that, "in the interest of fairness to the substantial
number of plaintiffs who have already initiated their suits in reliance on Royal Globe," the
decision overruling that case would apply prospectively only to plaintiffs who had not yet filed
a bad faith action. Id. at 305, 758 P.2d at 69, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 127. The court had earlier
applied the same reasoning in Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 829-30, 532 P.2d 1226,
1244, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 876 (1975) (holding adoption of comparative negligence principles
would apply only to instant case and cases not yet tried), and in Daly v. General Motors Corp.,
20 Cal. 3d 725, 743-44, 575 P.2d 1162, 1173, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 391 (1978) (holding use of
comparative fault doctrine in strict liability actions applied only to cases not yet tried). But see
Newman v. Emerson Radio Corp., 48 Cal. 3d 973, 993, 772 P.2d 1059, 1072, 258 Cal. Rptr.
592, 605 (1989) (giving full retroactive application to Foley).
123. 48 Cal. 3d 395, 770 P.2d 704, 257 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1989).
124. Id at 403-04, 770 P.2d at 707-08, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 295-96.
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miums charged and the coverage for all risks except those spe-
cifically excluded--cannot reasonably include an expectation of
coverage in property loss cases in which the efficient proximate
cause of the loss is an activity expressly excluded under the
policy. Indeed if we were to [rule otherwise], we would be re-
quiring ordinary insureds to bear the expense of increased pre-
miums necessitated by the erroneous expansion of their
insurers' potential liabilities.125
Dissenting from the Garvey decision, Justice Mosk stated: "The
majority, I must acknowledge, have succeeded in reaching a clear result:
in this court, the insurer wins and the insureds lose." 126 This prophecy
was incorrect. When the court again considered the concurrent cause
issue in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Von Der Lieth,12 7 it rejected
the insurer's contention that negligence ordinarily cannot give rise to a
covered loss under an "all risk" homeowner's insurance policy even if the
policy does not expressly exclude negligence as a covered peril.28
Instead, the court held that negligence is implicitly excluded as a
peril only if the negligence is attributable to an act undertaken solely for
the purpose of preventing losses caused by an expressly excluded peril. 12 9
Similarly, in AIU Insurance Co. v. Superior Court,130 the court held
that environmental pollution cleanup costs which are imposed by statute
fall within a typical insuring clause in a comprehensive general liability
policy which covers costs incurred "because of property damage."' 131
Distinguishing AIU, the court in Bank of the West v. Superior Court,132
held that insurable "damages" do not include the cost of restitution in an
action filed by consumers against a bank that engaged in misleading con-
duct to profit at the consumers' expense.13 3 The court reasoned that, if
insurance coverage were available to an insured who was required to dis-
gorge the ill-gotten proceeds of illegal activity, the insured "would simply
shift the loss to his insurer and, in effect, retain the proceeds of his un-
lawful conduct."1 34 This result was consistent with a previous California
125. Id. at 408, 770 P.2d at 711, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 299.
126. Id. at 416, 770 P.2d at 717, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 305 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
127. 54 Cal. 3d 1123, 820 P.2d 285, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 183 (1991).
128. Id. at 1134-35, 820.P.2d at 292-93, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 190-91.
129. Id.
130. 51 Cal. 3d 807, 799 P.2d 1253, 274 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1990).
131. Id. at 842-43, 799 P.2d at 1279, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 846. But see id. at 843, 799 P.2d at
1279-80, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 846-47 (stating that costs incurred as preventive measure to avoid
effects of hazardous waste are not "damages" within coverage provision).
132. 2 Cal. 4th 1254, 833 P.2d 545, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 538 (1992).
133. Id. at 1266-73, 833 P.2d at 553-58, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 545-51.
134. Id. at 1267, 833 P.2d at 553, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 546.
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decision 135 and cases from other jurisdictions. Also consistent with opin-
ions from other jurisdictions, the court held that a clause providing cov-
erage for "advertising injury" due to "unfair competition" in the bank's
business insurance policy covered only common-law unfair competition
claims and not the consumers' statutory claims for violation of the Cali-
fornia Unfair Business Practices Act.
136
In another insurance coverage opinion, the court considered
whether to reverse its earlier decision in Clemmer v. Hartford Insurance
Co. 137 In Clemmer, the court held that Insurance Code section 533,131
which provides that an insurer is not liable for the insured's willful acts,
does not apply if the insured intended to commit a wrongful act but did
not intend to inflict the ensuing harm.139 In J.C. Penney Casualty Insur-
ance Co. v. M.K.,'4 the court declined to overturn Clemmer, but created
an exception to that decision, holding that Insurance Code section 533
bars insurance coverage for inherently harmful intentional acts such as
child molestation, regardless of a showing that the insured subjectively
had no intent to harm the victim.
4 1
In Prudential-LMI Commercial Insurance v. Superior Court,42 the
court delivered a mixed result for insureds and insurers when it ad-
dressed coverage for progressive property damage. 4 3 The court held
that only the insurer of the risk at the time the damage manifests is re-
sponsible for indemnifying the insured for any covered loss, thereby re-
lieving subsequent insurers from that obligation.'" Moreover, the court
held that the contractual one-year period for commencing suit against
the insurer begins to run when the damage manifests, and subsequently
ified suits will be time barred. 45 At the same time, however, the court
held the one-year period for commencing suit is tolled from the time the
135. Jaffe v. Cranford Ins. Co., 168 Cal. App. 3d 930, 214 Cal. Rptr. 567 (1985).
136. Bank of the West, 2 Cal. 4th at 1262-63, 833 P.2d at 550-51, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 543-
44; see Unfair Practices Act, 1977 Cal. Stat. 299 (codified as amended at CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 17200-17209 (West 1987)).
137. 22 Cal. 3d 865, 587 P.2d 1098, 151 Cal. Rptr. 285 (1978).
138. CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (West 1972).
139. Clemmer, 22 Cal. 3d at 887, 587 P.2d at 1110, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 297.
140. 52 Cal. 3d 1009, 804 P.2d 689, 278 Cal. Rptr. 64, cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 280 (1991).
141. Id. at 1014, 1021-22, 804 P.2d at 690, 695, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 65, 70.
142. 51 Cal. 3d 674, 798 P.2d 1230, 274 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1990).
143. See id. at 699, 798 P.2d at 1246-47, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 403-04 (applying "manifesta-
tion" rule when loss is discovered after policy commences, but "loss-in-progress" rule when
loss is discovered before policy commences).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 686-87, 798 P.2d at 1238, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 395; see also id. at 682-84, 798 P.2d
at 1235-36, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 392-93 (discussing legislative history of statute authorizing con-
tractual one-year suit provision as support for "manifestation" rule).
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insured files a timely notice, pursuant to the policy notice provisions,
until the time the insurer formally denies the claim.
1 46
III. CONCLUSION
What conclusions can we draw from the California Supreme Court's
civil decisions during the past six years?
The present court has slowed the steady growth of expanding liabil-
ity, damages and insurance coverage. In part, this appears to be based
upon recognition that greater tort and insurance remedies entail corre-
sponding costs to the community, often in the form of higher prices or
decreased availability of beneficial products and services.1 47 Where the
court has departed from precedent, it has been motivated by pragmatic
considerations, and it has explained its holdings in terms of contempo-
rary trends and values. Accordingly, a litigant will not do well to ad-
vance theoretical or abstract arguments divorced from the tangible
implications of those arguments. Nor should a litigant ask the court to
turn back the clock. Neither abstractions nor nostalgia are persuasive.
In addition, the court has frequently given careful consideration to
decisions from other jurisdictions when deciding which direction Califor-
nia law should follow.148 As the Uniform Law Commission recognized
decades ago, where parties, transactions and issues are national in scope,
uniform laws facilitate legitimate business interests. While the court has
not expressly articulated this view, its decisions and reasoning are consis-
tent with it.
Finally, the frequency of dissenting opinions reflects a diversity of
opinion among the members of the court.1 49 Moreover, there has been
considerable turnover in the membership of the court in the past few
years. New justices usually require a reasonable period of time to settle
into their new roles, establish their individual identities and develop their
146. Id. at 693, 798 P.2d at 1242, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 399; see also id. at 687-91, 798 P.2d at
1238-41, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 395-98 (discussing out-of-state authority and legal commentators'
views on equitable tolling issue).
147. See, e.g., Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 751 P.2d 470, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412
(1988) (identifying some costs of imposing strict liability on drug manufacturers, including
increased cost of medication and reluctance of drug manufacturers to undertake new research
due to increased cost and decreased availability of insurance).
148. See, e.g., Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 1254, 1269, 833 P.2d 545,
554-55, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 538, 547-48 (1992); Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 46
Cal. 3d 287, 297-98, 758 P.2d 58, 63-64, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116, 121-22 (1988).
149. See, e.g., Ford v. Gouin, 3 Cal. 4th 339, 834 P.2d 724, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 30 (1992)
(containing four separate opinions); Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 834 P.2d 696, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 2 (1992) (containing four separate opinions).
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judicial voices. This should stimulate further diversity and ensure that
competing views are fully aired.
Few generalizations, if any, may accurately be stated about the re-
sults in the California Supreme Court's decisions since 1987. The
method by which those decisions are reached, however, is well within
what we recognize as the evolutionary common-law process.
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